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This article relates technology studies to organization research and examines the
technology-as-text metaphor. The study of organization is incomplete as long as
tangible technology remains in its blind spot. Linguistic metaphors and analogies,
while capturing and indeed amplifying much of received understandings of tech-
nology, succeed only partially in repairing the situation. The image of the
palimpsest is used to highlight this critique and to visualize ways out. Thus, while
the main concern of the paper is to re-situate technology to the study of organiza-
tion, an argument is also put forward for a specific approach to the study of
technology.
Descriptors: technology, organizations, institutionalization, technical norms,
social norms, inscriptions
Introduction: Silent Inscription
At least since Latour and Woolgar's Laboratory Life (1979), the notion of
inscription has made a highly satisfactory passage from literary to social
theory. Anthropologically minded, Latour and Woolgar observed that the
exotic tribe who had previously been believed to be dedicated to the dis-
covery of nature, in fact, spent 'the greatest part of their day coding, mark-
ing, altering, correcting, reading and writing' (p.49). Instead of producing
mirror-like images of nature, they were discovered busily, almost compul-
sively, inscribing the world around them. Literary inscription, performed
with the aid of inscription devices, turned out to be the core activity of life
in the laboratory.
While this discovery met with anger by some, and amusement or enthusi-
asm by others, two misreadings were common. One was that the activity
of inscription, when not produced at its proper (literary) site, was taken as
a quaint activity of a strange tribe, living an isolated life in their sealed-
off laboratories: natural science is special. Another was that inscriptions
are authorial activities, performed by tool-using humans (groups or indi-
viduals) aiming to put a recognizable signature on the world.
We assume that literary inscription is of crucial importance, and also out-
side literature, but we wish to contest the two readings mentioned. Esteemed
reader, please stop reading and look around! See? You are unable to fulfil
Bernward Joerges, Barbara Czarniawska
our request - you will continue reading wherever you are. Far from being
naked and appealing directly to your senses, your surroundings are com-
pletely inscribed. It is far from clear who the authors are of most such
inscriptions. On closer inspection, they might reveal a signature, but not a
human one. The closest signatures we can read, sitting now at Charles de
Gaulle airport and revising this paper, are 'Delsey' and 'SAS'.
Our starting points are therefore that the worlds around us are carefully and
completely inscribed, much like the worlds of science, and that the major-
ity of these inscriptions are author/iz/ed by organizations, not persons. We
consider organizations not as actor-networks, but rather as action nets: col-
lective actions related to one another within a given institutional order.
Production needs sales, sales need advertising. Action nets may sometimes
affect a personal authorship ('Roy Buck, your shift manager'). As readers
of many such inscriptions, we know better than to believe in Roy Buck;
he is as much an organizational product as the late Alistair MacLean. Action
nets always involve human and non-human actants, that is, '... that which
accomplishes or undergoes an act' (Greimas and Courtes 1982: 5). Non-
human actants are things commonly called natural or technical, but usually
not considered 'social' in their own right by social scientists.
We will argue, then, for the acknowledgment of both the fact of pervasive
inscription via technology and of its organizational origins in organization
studies. We begin by pointing out the persistent unwillingness of many
social scientists, including students of organizations, to account conceptu-
ally for the peculiar agency of material technical artifacts and reflect on
some of the reasons for this state of affairs. Post-Marxian or post-Weberian
approaches in organization research have, we claim, abandoned a concern
with the place of machinery in a world of action. The metaphor of
'technology-as-text', which has come to inspire much of current writing on
technology, has favoured the reappearance of machine technology (if
mostly in the guise of information and communication machines). Relating
this notion to the notion of inscription, we then attempt to reconcile a con-
cern for institutional order- which inspires both classic Marxian/Weberian
and recent organization studies - with an understanding of technology in
organizing processes. We are presenting technical norms/technical nor-
malization as the ways in which the patterns of organizing are inscribed in
technology and the ways in which organizations inscribe the technical
worlds they produce.
In order to display our concept of technical norms, as distinguished from
other social norms, we chose the example of an everyday technical arti-
fact, a mundane organizational product which demonstrates (better than
familiar examples of production technologies) the referentialities and out-
of-awareness-taken-for-grantedness of technical inscriptions to which we
draw attention. The notion of technical norms as silent inscriptions of insti-
tutional order is then highlighted in the concluding image of technology-
as-palimpsest.
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Technology and Organization
A social science based on the presuppositions of the Society/Nature
dichotomy - as is most social science - runs into problems when con-
fronting technology. Like human bodies, extrasomatic technical artifacts
represent an order of reality that cannot be dissolved into either 'nature' or
'culture'. It is for this reason that the natural sciences do not teach us much
about technology, either. In the engineering disciplines, curiously enough,
technical implements are routinely ascribed genuine socialness, even if it
tends to be extremely diluted. Engineers teaching construction or develop-
ing production technologies, for example, and, of course, ergonomists, do
not see any problem in talking about machine-man-systems or machine
behaviour, which Simon (1982) attempted to explicate by contrasting a gen-
eral theory of constructing with 'discovering' sciences.
What about organization studies then, with their roots in both engineering
and social science practice? Like other social science disciplines, organi-
zation studies have had and continue to have peculiar difficulties in grasp-
ing the 'the inner structure of the artifact', to take up Elaine Scarry's
expression (1985). While technology studies have proliferated, much like
the technologies themselves, the happenings inside machinery and other
tangible technical artifacts were mostly described and explained in engi-
neering or ideological terms. We will not attempt a full overview here, but
point, rather, to a series of episodes in the history of the discipline which
have set, it seems to us, the tone in debates about technology.
Studies in the Tavistock tradition, where the notion of socio-technical sys-
tems was first introduced systematically (e.g. Rice 1958), began to acknowl-
edge the weight of the 'technical', but still focused their conceptual energy
on the 'socio-' and firmly clung to the idea of duality. The concept has
been revived by some authors, along with the turn to technology in soci-
ology that came in the 1980s (see e.g. Mayntz 1988; T.E. Burns and Dietz
1991). These studies remained in the same dichotomizing spirit, even if the
'socio-' part of the term was noticeably enriched by notions of technolog-
ical design, choice, regulation and the like. Contingency theory, the (still)
dominant approach to technology in organization theory, originated from
a strong interest in relations between technology and control systems (Burns
and Stalker 1961; Woodward 1965), but ended actually excluding tangible
technology, rarefying the notion of technology into task structures of var-
ious kinds (see, for instance, Scott 1990, even if he opens up somewhat to
social constructivist arguments). Even in new institutionalism, there are
attempts to separate and keep apart 'institutional environments' from 'tech-
nical environments', thus protecting the social world from intrusions of
machines and other things (Meyer and Scott 1983).
One could say, with some exaggeration, that it took several serious cata-
strophes to re-introduce material technology as a central concern in orga-
nization studies. Indeed, catastrophe studies (such as Turner 1978; Perrow
1984; Rochlin et al. 1987; Weick 1988; Vaughan 1990; Shrivastava 1993)
have done more than traditional industrial technology research to prepare
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the ground for a broad re-evaluation of the 'question of technology' in orga-
nization studies (as opposed to both technology-related issues in particular
industrial organizations and to technology and society issues at large).
Why, one might ask, should the activity inside machinery be of any inter-
est to organizational theory? Presumably, most people would agree that any
organizing takes place simultaneously in three dimensions: symbolic, polit-
ical, and material - or practical, as we will also say (Czarniawska-Joerges
1993). Entire schools are dedicated to one or two of these aspects, recently,
mostly to the first two. The practical dimension, which should prominently
represent technology - in close connection with the other two - has gone
missing. Goodman and Sproull, for instance, thus concluded their overview
of the field:
'While there appears to be a movement to focus primarily on technology as socially
constructed, we feel that some balance is necessary. There are issues that concern
technology as a physical reality. These have not been well addressed and have
implications for doing work on technology and organizations. (...) We feel that a
fruitful approach would be to increase our understanding of both the social and the
physical aspects of technology (...) The real contribution, however, will be under-
standing the intersection between both forms of reality.' (1990: 260-261)
The problem might have to do with treating the notion of 'socially con-
structed' as synonymous with 'unreal', or 'immaterial', or 'to be changed
at will'. Considering, however, that all construction is social, the adjective
is actually superfluous in this context. The point worth making is that, as
Latour used to say, the better constructed, the more real things become
(Latour 1996). Setting 'symbolic' against 'material' is thus a doubtful
proposition, as there can be no immaterial symbols, while anybody, organic
or not, human or inhuman, can be used in the work of symbolization. The
gap between the symbolic and the material (both social) has its origins, we
claim, back in time, in the ways the founders of modem social sciences
(mis)treated technology, and especially in the ways they were subsequently
(mis)interpreted by their followers. Nevertheless, we believe that there are
insights to be rescued from the past, so even if most technology researchers
today appear to avoid referring back to what Niklas Luhmann has called
'Old-European sociology', we will risk a glance.
Marx, for instance, was always quite alone among Marxists in making the
question of the social nature and function of machinery a central theoreti-
cal concern (see e.g. the 15th chapter of the first volume of Capital). In
Marx' concept of technology two points were critical. First, technology rep-
resented a process of delegating bodily functions to extra corporeal sites:
tools and machines were, like all material artifacts, projections of the human
body and its organs. The meaning of these projections - unfulfilled under
capitalist conditions was to liberate the human body from isolation and
pain.
Second, technology represented science: historically, the decisive step in
the evolution of technology was the transition from tools to machines (more
precisely, machine tools). These were artifacts, according to Marx, in which
tools that had previously been guided by human hands were now guided
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by a physical mechanism. This only became possible by applying scien-
tific knowledge. Contemporary industry, he claimed, pursued the principle
of breaking down every production process into its 'constituent move-
ments', without regard and respect for possible ways of doing things by
hand, and this was the foundation on which 'the new engineering sciences'
had grown. 'The manifold, apparently petrified forms of the industrial
process were now dissolved into so and so many conscious and systematic
applications of natural sciences in order to achieve given useful ends' (Marx
1877/1959: 381).
The mechanism of the machine tool substituted for and expanded bodily
intelligence and its unreliable discipline. For Marx, this historical transition
was the crucial factor unclenching a build-up of ever more comprehensive
technical developments and integrations in other technical domains, such as
power and transmission machinery, transport and communication systems,
and the mechanization of machine-tool production itself.
For a long time, machine tools remained the only type of machine accorded
something like conceptual status in organization studies, only recently
rivalled by the computer, which, in fact, can be viewed as the ultimate
machine tool, in as much as it is intended to simulate many other, simpler,
information processing machines (Zuboff 1984; Joerges 1989). Indeed, the
root metaphor for the fundamental Marxian antagonism, Head versus Hand,
could have led to an elaboration of the evolution of communication (rather
than production) technology had Marx sided with the Head. Meanwhile,
sociologists studying 'the Computer' prefer to take their metaphors from
linguistics (Woolgar 1985) or, more frequently, from the evolutionism of
so-called computer science, and not from Marxian analysis (Joerges 1989).
Nevertheless, it is easy to extend Marx' thinking: the machine-tool took
over the hammer from the fist, just as the computer took over the pen from
the hand. Marx' concept of machine work has mostly survived in its ide-
ological version as dead work, although he also held in esteem highly enthu-
siastic versions of the liberating potential of machinery. For him, machines
wrote history; they represented a central generative mechanism of societal
evolution.
Another crucial influence was that of Max Weber, who has often been
reproached not only for ignoring technology, but for declaring technology
(in the form of tools or machines and their use) as a non-object for soci-
ology. This is plausible if one stays with his theory of social action, as
enunciated in Economy and Society. Elsewhere, Weber had accorded what
he called the technical order - the systems of technical norms and rules
the same categorical status as other legitimate orders such as law, ethics
or mores (not the least the Skat order, Skat being the quintessential German
card game, like bridge in England). Machine action and human action (at
least workers' actions) were put on the same plane. In his essay on
Stammler, for instance, Weber argued that technology is 'first of all a pro-
cedure following rules that have been set for specific ends' (Weber
1907/1973: 324ff.). He then elaborated that the cooperation of machine
components followed 'rules set by humans' in exactly the same logical
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meaning as the cooperation of 'workhorses, slaves or - ultimately -
"free" human workers' in an industrial plant. It is completely irrelevant, he
said, in view of the meaning of the terms 'social order' or 'regulation',
whether workers were tied to the 'overall production mechanism' by 'cor-
rectly calculated "psychical" force' (caused by the work order, ethical
notions, and so on) or whether, as in the case of 'thinglike machine parts',
it was a question of their physical and chemical qualities. For Weber, it
was thus the technical order which causally contributed to the cooperation
of machine parts, just as the legal order contributed causally to the human
action, and thus shaped the regularities of social life 'most fundamentally'.
Thus, even if one wishes to hold on to Weber's concept of social action,
one may still allow 'nonhuman events' to figure as links in action chains,
capable of 'causal explanation and meaningful interpretation' because they
follow legitimate order. The technical order, insofar as it regulates non-
human events, must be put on the same categorical plane as the work order.
While, in principle, Marx welcomed the transition from tool-like imple-
ments to machines, Weber seems to have held a deeply skeptical view. A
precursor of latter-day technological pessimism, he maintained that, in
principle, action mediated through modem machines loses its capacity to
reflect autonomous values. At the very least, he remained ambivalent,
becoming increasingly dysphoric. Marx, in contrast, was optimistic, envi-
sioning a historical movement that would, one fine day, shed the chains of
the capitalist order.
It would be a matter for historical and sociological studies of science to
clarify whether it was because of, or in spite of, the Great Masters that the
social scientists of the post-war period have, until quite recently, treated
technology as an exogenous factor. Lutz (1983), on behalf of German indus-
trial sociology, and Coleman (1986), speaking for Anglo-American main-
stream sociology at large, offered explanations based on a loss of
institutional autonomy and an increasing dependence of research on pow-
erful external agencies. The implication was that this made for the uncrit-
ical adoption of images of society (here: of technology) entertained by those
who underwrote research. Propositions to search out the genuinely social
meanings of engineers' constructions, whether they came from the Left
(unions) or from elsewhere, were fended off, more or less ritually. This
stance not only accorded with what everybody took for granted, it also
helped to shield the technological core of the industrial system from
criticism, and, in this sense, to keep it sacrosanct.
A Turn to 'Technology-as-Text'
Nothing seems further apart than Marxian and Weberian terminologies and
the vocabulary of technology as literary inscription, or more generally the
turn to 'technology-as-text' that has characterized more recent technology
studies. There are indeed those who see a secular break between 19th cen-
tury technology and social science (both 'mechanistic') and 20th century
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technology and social science, tuned to information/communication or
immaterial culture (see Rammert 1992). True enough, sociologists currently
interested in technology privilege information machines and indulge in a
rhetoric of immaterialism and dematerialization.
It is not difficult, however, to translate computer studies back into Marxian
or Weberian conceptual language, or to apply the rhetoric of information/
communication to older technologies such as clocks or sailing ships, and
while most attempts to bring back machines to the field take a different
course than the one we propose, we are certainly not the only ones to try
to keep together the symbolic, the political and the practical.
One apparent place to look for antecedents are anthropological approaches,
which tend to take for granted that cultures include practically operating
machinery and its ecological base. Departments of anthropology with
Marxist orientations, for instance, in erstwhile Eastern Europe, cherished
the notion of 'material culture', but succumbed to the strict rule that anthro-
pology must not study its own culture, and therefore arrested their interest
in pottery-making machines. In contrast, a lively Foucauldian school, which
came to appreciate all kinds of technical metaphors for organizational dis-
cipline, power and control, largely assimilated the two sides of the equa-
tion. Thus, over-writing the social with the technical has been achieved
only too well- technology proper has again been lost from sight. As Anne
Loft, discussing time technologies, observed with respect to the great
model: ' ... Foucault's use of machine metaphors to describe techniques of
discipline led him to conflate techniques and technologies and to ignore the
role of machinery in discipline' (1991: 8).
In neo-contingency organization studies, there is one way of understand-
ing 'workflow' which promises to focus on exactly the matters that we
consider to be central. According to Sorge:
'Workflow is the process whereby inputs, including raw materials, manufactured
components and parts, machine capacity and human effort are organized in order
to transform them into output. It presupposes differentiated arrays of machines,
jobs, organizational sub-units, people with specific skills and knowledge, and it
consists of the technical and social arrangements that allow human effort, machine
capacity and material inputs to be brought together to achieve output goals (...)
"Work" may be done by machines or by humans or by a combination of the two.
In the course of technical change, boundaries between human and machine work
are changed, and combinations of the two also change. Variables should therefore
be able to reflect such shifts rather than be biased by them.' (Sorge 1989: 27).
With the exception of the traditional contrast between 'technical' and
'social', we could not agree more with this message. The problem is, that
the variables favoured by the neo-contingency theorists are so abstract
('workflow continuity', 'product variability'), that although they do not
counteract the point of blending human and non-human work, they do
little with it. Useful as evaluation variables, they do not do their work as
explanatory variables. This is perhaps unavoidable, in that they rely upon
ostensive rather than performative definitions (variables are treated like
physical attributes), and aim at structural correlations, even when focusing
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processes. As a result, the affinities between technologies and institutional
orders have been observed but, as Sorge admits himself, the nature of these
affinities 'is not precise enough' (1991: 168).
Within a symbolist perspective in organization studies, researchers began
to demonstrate that artifacts tell us something, that they are more than 'mere
physical matter'. They are symbols that can be read, above and beyond
their practical use (see e.g. Horning 1988; Gagliardi 1990). While these
authors would undoubtedly agree that tools and machines not only sym-
bolize, but also do work, they still seem to assume that it is necessary to
separate, or even contrast the two uses. Even Karl Weick, so keenly tuned
to the role of technology in organizing says, for instance: 'The odd twist
in traditions is that concrete human action, know-how embodied in prac-
tice, persists and is transmitted only if it becomes symbolic' (p.115). If
symbolization was all there is, we would have no tradition to speak of. It
is not only that memory needs to be material: the very action is preserved
and perpetuated in machines which carry out the actions previously, or
alternatively, performed by humans.
In this paper, we wish to show that symbolization requires materialization,
and how work to be repeatedly done requires abstractification into norms
and rules: the two faces of inscription. At first glance, this position seems
close to those constructionist approaches in science and technology research
where non-human components are unquestioningly embraced and allowed
to speak and act (for introductory texts, see Woolgar 1988; McKenzie 1992;
Bijker and Law 1992). Authors such as Steve Woolgar (1985), Michel
Callon (1988), Karin Knorr Cetina 1988), Bruno Latour (1993), and many
others, conceptualize technical artifacts explicitly and more or less literally
as actors, and as social subjects of action. Machines not only partake in
actions here, but become autonomous political actors.
We consider such claims too strong and overshooting the aim of coming
closer to genuinely technical practices and their material components. With
respect to the autonomous actor issue, it is important to see that the oper-
ations of heterogeneous complexes of technical artifacts always figure in a
great many human action and ecological patterns. This is suddenly revealed
in cases of failure. Technologies are better conceived of as institutional-
ized organizing patterns than as organizational members. Charles Perrow
has applied the terms 'systems accidents' to misadventures which cannot
be accounted for by recourse to decisions and actions of persons or to 'indi-
vidual' components of machinery (Perrow 1986). Perrow thus properly rec-
ognizes the socialized character of practically every technology, but again
fails to differentiate the ways in which machine operations and other social
actions can be coupled or decoupled to each other and to human opera-
tions. In turn, trust in machinery is 'system trust' (Kaufmann 1973; Giddens
1990) as distinct from personal trust.
It is a task for organizational research to spell out why the delegation of
personal autonomy or of trusteeship to materialized technical systems is,
in many situations, preferred to handing them over to other humans.
Notwithstanding a rhetoric of 'Let us look for social, not technical solu-
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tions for our problems!', a closer look almost always reveals that new forms
of problem solution imply more, not less technology (if of a different kind).
The label social usually means more accepted (or morally more accept-
able) technical, not less technical in the sense of materially inscribed.
Transferring autonomy and discretion to impersonal, extrasomatic systems
seems to incite and require massive resymbolizations of the organizational
space, both for those who pursue an advantage and those who are threat-
ened with loss.
All this only means that technically normated things are instances of phe-
nomena which have always engaged sociology: realities and relationships
that resist explanation by accounting for actions attributed to individual
persons or even groups. Instead, in the following, we will present technical
artifacts as exteriorized institutions, engraved in the material ('natural') bases
of societal processes, rather than as homunculi in their own right.
How, then, can one account for what machines do? How far does the tech-
nology-as-text(s) concept carry us? What kinds of inscriptions do techni-
cal norms represent? What distinguishes them from other social inscriptions
and prescriptions? The most persuasive meaning of the metaphor has to do
with the notion that machinery does some kind of writing. This notion of
'inscription devices' is already central in Latour and Woolgar (1979), who
showed how impossible it was to separate the knowledge produced by
scientists from that produced by practical technology, i.e. experimental
apparatus.
'... there might be an essential similarity between the inscription capabilities of
apparatus, the manic passion for marking, coding and filing, and the literary skills
of writing, persuasion, and discussion. Thus the observer could even make sense
of such obscure activities as a technician's grinding the brains of rats, by realising
that the eventual end product of such activity might be a highly valued diagram.'
(1979: 51-52)
Latour and Woolgar spoke of the inscribing which the laboratory appara-
tus - the grinder, in the example quoted - performed. They were not
particularly interested in how the inscription potential, as represented by
laboratory technology, has been generated, how technologies are inscribed
into nature, and how they acquire inscription capabilities and begin them-
selves to inscribe. They watched organizing in progress, and noticed that
it included machines which make inscriptions. They aptly concluded that
this is how science is being done. We wish to go further and claim that
this is how organizing is being done. What they showed for one modem
institution - science, we want to do for another - modem organization.
All organizing, in its symbolical, political and practical aspects, needs to
be inscribed into the matter in order to make organizations durable (indeed,
possible).
Here we re-make the argument formulated by Latour (1992) who said that
technology is society made durable. We agree, in general terms, although
organizing comes in between. Technology makes organizing durable, thus
contributing to the institutional stability of one of its products - modem
organization - and through it perhaps many others. We would like to push
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the argument even further by saying that modem organizations, as users of
machines for producing machines and other artifacts, are given the task of
inscribing the institutional order into the matter.
Perrow (1991) claims that we live in societies of organizations. We would
like to attempt to gain an understanding, on a modest scale, of how it has
come to be so. Organizations have been given the task, to resort to func-
tionalist parlance, of inscribing institutions into the matter. If organizations
are envisioned as action nets transcending face-to-face interactions (rather
than some precarious entities in the realm of social meanings, located some-
where between a world of Platonic concepts and human brains and bod-
ies), it is easy to see that the existence of any such action net requires a
more or less permanent lock into large technical systems. Through the tele-
phone into satellite-based, global telecommunication systems; through the
toaster into integrated electricity grids fed with nuclear energy; through
wrist watches into a technical system called World Time, anchored even
deeper in the universe.
These extended and expansive technical systems and their countless ter-
minals represent overlarge and hyperfast amounts of elementary part-
actions, easily overlooked by the sociologist and organization theorist. One
can gain access to them via an inspection of technical norms.
Technical and Other Social Norms
Max Weber once said that capitalist organization could do without the 'eth-
ical props' of inner-worldly asceticism once it was put on 'mechanical foun-
dations' (Weber 1904/1972: 203). We will now consider how organizing
processes are partly exteriorized and develop extrasomatic form: how the
ethical props of rigid work orders which Weber described have been
replaced by 'mechanical' and, lately, by information technologies. While
Weber, and most sociologists since, have looked at the organizational pre-
conditions and consequences of technicization, they have not examined its
mechanism as such. We view it as a particular mode of institutionalization:
the exteriorization of organizing norms onto tangible technical installations
and apparatus.
Our argument runs as follows: over time, societies have transferred vari-
ous institutional responsibilities to machine technologies and so removed
these responsibilities from everyday awareness and made them unreadable.
As organized actions are externalized in machines, and as these machiner-
ies grow more complicated on ever larger scales, norms and practices of
organizing progressively devolve into society's material base: inscribed in
machines, institutions are literally 'black-boxed' (Whitley 1972). Two
effects merit attention.
First, obviously, the risky penetration - deep inscription - of ecological
systems. In interpreting the risks of overloading and destroying material
life bases in the course of enlarging technical systems, we customarily
employ the metaphor of nature as a limited good, devoured by technology.
372
However, the risk lies just as much in the enlargement and delimitation of
practically accessible nature via the implantation of technical systems. Each
technical leap expands practically known and accessible (thus socially rel-
evant) matter, or 'nature', removing the limits of the once unknown and
uncontrollable. Space flight creates new operational spaces which require
social regulation, genetic engineering creates new domains of bodily
processes which need social control, information technologies expand orga-
nizational environments and markets well beyond anybody's good.
Informatics, however, is only the most recent example in this context. What
multinationals do with the help of the computers, the Dutch merchants
accomplished centuries ago with the help of their boats. Technological
stretching of the world is a process as old as civilization itself, and stretch-
ing is only the other side of shrinking.
The second effect lies in a hitherto unique historical increase in the vari-
ety and spread of organizational forms, meanings, and ways of life. The
more organizations inscribe society into machines, the more non-technical
inscriptions multiply and their circulation accelerates. Weber illustrated it
well by using the example of the well-tempered piano and the grand orches-
tra. The technical normalization of all musical instruments and their tonal
product, inscribed materially into the modem piano through the introduc-
tion of quasi-metric ('tempered') scales, occasioned the enormous growth
of musical forms and presumably experiences that came with large sym-
phonic orchestras (what Weber called 'rational music', see Joerges and
Wagner 1997). Similarly, the increasing standardization of internets entails
a bewildering growth of multi-medial content.
Although they are all about norm-oriented action and thus about problems
of regulating and ordering social life, 'technical norms' or 'rules of tech-
nology' remain conspicuously absent from the indexes of social science
textbooks, be it sociology or organization theory. Social scientists are
declared competent in social norms; technical norms are placed in charge
of engineers. A clean division of labour is securely in place.
By such machinations, one is tempted to say, the inscribed world of mate-
rial artifacts, tools, machines, instruments and implements, apparata and
automata, ever ready to continue inscribing, is made into an illegitimate
subject for social science. We do research on organizations which develop
and operate highly complicated and risky machinery, on people who have
opinions and knowledge about them, on societies in which technology fig-
ures as powerful ideology or as a central cultural symbol. However, since
materialized technology remains shielded from analysis, the ubiquitous phe-
nomenon of technical norms escapes our notice- things like DIN A4, 220
Volt, 600 becquerel per kg, or ISDN.
In sociology, the term 'social norms' usually refers to legitimate collective
expectations and prescriptions for action. One may ask then, to what kind
of expectations, prescriptions and legitimations the term 'technical norms'
refers. Of course, there are numerous studies concerned with the politico-
economic functions of bodies and authorities responsible for technical nor-
malization and standardization. In this literature, the notion of technical
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norms is explicated, if at all, by recourse to official definitions. The German
Institute for Normalization, for instance, defines a technical norm as 'the
exemplary result of the work of normalization' and as 'planned uniformity
of material and immaterial objects (formulas, definitions, procedures) car-
ried out jointly by interested circles on national, regional and international
levels in the interest of the common wealth'.
Abstract explications by engineers specializing in technical normalization
provide little help (Bauer 1982). Otto Kienzle, nestor of German normal-
ization engineering, put it flatly, yet more instructively: 'A norm is the sin-
gular solution of a repetitive task'. Occasional attempts by engineering
scientists to reap more fundamental insights from the dry subject are instruc-
tive, too: Charpentier, a high-ranking French normalization official, noted,
for example, that:
'Simplification according to the spirit of normalization namely means searching for
the essential; recording the fundamental rhythms of nature to which man is attuned.
Likewise, simplification includes the search for the guiding threads that make it
possible to clarify the inextricable and contribute to a state where everyone can be
afforded common knowledge.' (1977: 652, translation BJ)
Such formulations stress that technical norms apparently have much to do
with cognitive economy and with making technical knowledge available in
the form of a public good. They also connote romantic conceptions of nature
and society, although neither aspect is related to societal analysis in this
literature. Nor is it very helpful, at least initially, to turn to the highly sys-
tematized lists of technical norms from which DIN Al, 2, 3, 4 or 110 V,
220 V, 300 000 V, 500 000 V and things like that are taken.
In order to get closer, one must turn to technical things actually function-
ing in their 'natural', that is social, contexts. In and out of organizations,
computers offer (too) easy examples. When we start the new Powerbook
we just bought, a smiling face will welcome us and softly lets us know
that we are about to learn and be instructed in, the norms (mostly techni-
cal-procedural) of the Mac community, to be imbibed into us via a step-
by-step action programme. It does not take a social scientist to observe that
the instructor in the programme is a man and the learner is a woman, or
to predict that this order of things may soon be reversed on a wave of polit-
ical correctness. Most users know by now that gender is not written into
the computer via technical norms. True, much in the constructivist sociol-
ogy of technology is devoted to the argument that gender order, or capi-
talist order, or democratic order for that matter, can be and is written into
specific types of machinery. This kind of 'unmasking' analysis has been
systematically performed in other contexts, for instance showing the use of
technology in managerial control (Noble 1984; or Burawoy 1979, who
shows how it is sometimes reversed).
Those are cases of intentional managerial control. Shifting the focus to
institutional control, we point to instances where the controlling power
stems from the fact that a given practice has been institutionalized and
therefore is taken for granted. No doubt, individual and group actors often
seek to exploit institutions for their political purposes (see e.g. Jansson
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1992, on how the institution of investment calculus is used in public-sector
power games). In contrast, we wish to draw attention to one of the ways
in which society controls itself, so to speak; socializes its members by unob-
trusive measures, and thereby constantly re-constructs itself.
Recognizing technical norms as social norms of a particular kind also means
recognizing that there is no reason to assume a determinist connection
between the content of the technical and non-technical norms they may or
may not promote. A computer in a matriarchal society would speak a female
voice, but it would still be recruited into supporting as well as subverting
the dominant institutional order. Rather than unmasking particular power
games or positing deterministic structural relationships, the inscription per-
spective entails something like an 'ethnomethodology of machines'. An
ethnomethodology, though, unlike its classics, is vividly interested in the
translocal and transtemporal connections that machine actions help to
achieve (Czarniawska 1996; Czarniawska and Joerges 1996).
A Mineral Water Bottle, For Example...
It is often implicitly assumed that organizational control is exerted 'within'
organizations. This is perhaps an unavoidable price for reifying the notion
of organization, but it produces a peculiar blindness, as control exerted by
organizational products used daily, unreflectively, escapes the researcher's
attention. Take a bottle of mineral water, brand-named Christinenbrunnen,
representing a tiny splinter of the technical consumption apparatus. If, on
a walk in the mountains, we take a sip of water from a source, we quench
our thirst, compliment the taste, and go on walking, possibly nurturing a
romantic dream of life close to nature. Each contact with an industrially
produced bottle of a mineral water, this simple machine, however, is an
opportunity to imbibe a portion of an institutional order. Consumer goods
have become highly semioticized objects and the example is rich in inscrip-
tions, prescriptions, proscriptions and engravings. Needless to say, inscrip-
tions are not only made in numerical or lexical codes. Shapes, sizes, colours,
textures are also inscriptions. There is much that can be read from those,
with regard to relevant technical and other social norms.
Let us begin at the top of the cap, where the royal symbol appears, the
crown - a metaphor far removed from technology. On the label in the
middle of the bottle the crown is repeated in gold, linked with the attribute
'premium quality' - a rather high-flying value signifier for water, and, in
addition, a commercial standard for top-class consumables. On the cap, the
message continues with the instruction that one has to turn it anti-clockwise
in order to open it - a fully internalized quasi-technical norm inscribed in
our fingers, tied up with deeply engraved behavioural routines. (Note that
there is an extensive body of literature devoted to the international war on
screw pitches.) Just below the cap, an additional line says 'safety lid', sig-
nalling compliance with a series of technical cap standards, presumably for-
mulated in a regulation imposed by the VDI(Verein Deutscher Ingenieure),
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Figure 1
What is Written
on and What is
Written in a
Mineral Water
Bottle
Perforated Twist-off Cap
Print on top:
blue crown (emblem)
R
Christinen
Source
Premium Quality
Print on side:
OPEN (3 arrows)
Safety cap
Label:
do not litter ...
(Pictogram)
Quick drink
With valuable minerals
and nutrients -
for people with high-level expectations
for whom quality of life means
everything.
Golden crown (emblem)
(R)
Christinen
0.33 1 e
no deposit
Source
PREMIUM QUALITY
(on golden banner)
NATURAL
MINERAL WATER
CARBONATED, FLUORIDATED,
FROM THE CHRISTINEN SOURCE,
BIELEFELD
THE CROWN OF REFRESHMENTS
Excerpts from the Analysis by Chemical Institute Fresenius, Aug. 19,
Cations:
Sodium Ions (Na+)
Calcium Ions (Ca++)
Magnesium Ions (Mg++)
mg/l.
472,0
4,8
1,6
Anions:
Hydrocarbons Ions (HCO3-)
Chloride Ions (Cl-)
Sulfate Ions (SO4)
mg/l.
537,0
372,0
73,7
(blue jet of water)
TEUTOBURGER MINERALBRUNNEN GMBH & CO, D-4800
Bottom of bottle
34.5
49 0.33 1
(5glass works' stamp)d
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and therefore quite mandatory. Cross-references to safety and liability legal
norms would have to be researched. Note here, especially, the perforated
twist-off cap. This norm for breaking at a pre-inscribed place and pressure
is embedded in the material of the cap. It cannot be seen, but our fingers
know it. Then it continues by saying 'Natural Mineral Water', and read in
context with the association-rich name Christinenbrunnen, another super-
ordinate value is evoked here - naturalness - immediately exacted, how-
ever, by the 'R' in the circle - the water from the well has a registered
trademark, implying another series of legal-commercial norms. The pale-
blue script underneath says 'carbon acid added', the natural water, in fact,
being an artificial product, regulated through specific technical and legal
standards laid down in food acts. An 'excerpt from the analysis of the
Chemical Institute Fresenius' follows, still in a prominent place (dated
17.02.1986, a high-ranking technical time standard is brought to bear- the
calendar norm). At this point, things become very technical indeed: the
content of six cations and anions is given in appropriate measuring units
it is left to readers to imagine the measurement technology and requisite
apparatus of the chemical lab.
On the left side, an internationally standardized bar code is presented, in
which all information relevant for producers, distributors and buyers are
encrypted, so that the registration machine at the point of sale can read,
store and print it. At present, another standardization war is going on about
unifying such product labels; the bar code is to be made relevant for banks,
too, in order to link up with non-cash, electronic payment and account sys-
tems. Opposite the bar code, some enigmatic letters and signs are inscribed,
presumably referring to inner-organizational technical and accounting
norms of the water producer.
The upper margin of the label displays the message 'Quickdrink' - one
more reference to non-technical time standards and an allusion to the
cultural standardization of refreshing liquids and also, perhaps, to the advice
to drink faster while at work. On the other side, we find the volume measure
of the bottle content, further illuminated by an engraving on the base of
the bottle. This can be taken as another hint that there is no standard com-
mercial way of trading back the bottle - information about a normative
vacuum, as it were. Instead, right next to this, there is a signal that it can
be recycled - environmental quality norms are brought into focus
together with an imperative for everyone to 'join in!', a non-technical norm
of solidarity with little mandatory power. Finally, above the bar code, there
is another inscription: 'With valuable minerals and trace elements for the
ambitious, for whom quality of life means everything' - an ultimate
value resume, to agree with the philosopher Nicholas Rescher's (1969)
term, for a multitude of cultural, health-related and moral standards-
including a somewhat vague link between mg/kg trace elements and the
Good Life.
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Three Sub-Genres of Technical Inscription
We can now say: Technical norms are the institutional structure of machin-
ery. Let us take a more systematic look, then, at the manifold flora and fauna
of technical norms that make up the technical order. The example points to
a variety of normative terms inscribed by organizations onto their object
matter, with the help of machines. In naming some of them technical, others
non-technical, we have applied two criteria: in the first place, technical norms
are inscribed by organizations - inscriptions made by non-organized agents
(initials on a tree bark, a handwritten label on a homemade medicine) are
not legitimate technical norms. Second, technical norms contain an explicit
or implicit reference to a quantitative measure. We call social norms tech-
nical, then, to the extent that they represent organizationally imposed action
prescriptions that have recourse to measures and/or formal procedures (algo-
rithms) justified, in turn, in natural or engineering science discourses. In a
technical norm for lying, reference is made to galvanic skin resistance, for
instance; a non-technical norm may refer to the appropriate legal definitions
of trustworthiness. A technical norm for housing need is linked to measures
such as square meters per person, a non-technical one to judgements of
social prestige.
Within this category of technical norms, different kinds may be usefully
distinguished, depending on the processes on which they operate: cultural,
natural, or material-artifactual.
A caveat is in order: availing ourselves of such distinctions does not mean
that ontological differences between Society, Technology and Nature are
relevant to our theme. Technical norms are no less social than non-technical
ones, and they can be imprinted on 'machinery' and 'nature' as well as on
'humans', to put it in terms of commonsense ontological notions. This tri-
chotomy and the de-socialization of two of its elements are not the basis
for the distinction, but the product of its application: organizations con-
tribute to the generation and stabilization of the three realms of reality by
imposing this world-view. (The human body is one category that does not
easily fit into any of the classes, or rather it fits in all three at once; thus
the interest of constructivist social studies in that subject/object.) In other
words, the view is part of the inscribing, and we must account for its obvi-
ous efficiency in terms of the ways the three sub-genres of technical norms
that we distinguish are interrelated and related to yet other, non-technical
genres of inscription.
The first sub-genre covers norms for human action, defining human rights
and duties. The technical action norms of this genre are, for instance, pre-
scriptions such as 'turn the bottle cap clockwise' or 'so many units per
hour' in piece work. '14 m2-per-scientist office space' would be another
example. These norms indicate how one has to behave vis-a-vis a machine
or some other material artifact. The scientist is allowed 14 Mi2! Such norms
will have to be inscribed into human actors, so that they know better than
to demand 15 m2 for their desks.
The second sub-genre contains norms for machine behaviour, for example
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20 miles per gallon, or the familiar DIN A4, a standard page in Europe;
220 V, the regulation voltage in Europe, future supernorms such as ISDN,
and so forth. Such norms prescribe not only how specific technical artifacts
are to be constructed, but also how they are to function. There is a great
variety of modes for inscribing technical norms into tangible artifacts:
durable or transient, strict or with ample tolerance, superficial or deep, self-
controlled or in need of external control, self-adjusting or requiring outside
repair, and so on.
These may be denoted as technical norms in the narrow sense of the term:
norms and orders imposed on material technical systems. To talk about
technical norms as action prescriptions (or proscriptions) of a particular
kind would be trivial, however, if this meant only prescriptions for design-
ing, constructing, producing, eventually operating and using material tech-
nical artifacts. Less trivial and rich in conceptual consequences would be
to interpret this class of technical norms as action prescriptions for what
technical artifacts do themselves: how they have to behave, quite indepen-
dent of continuous human intervention. A clock in the Central Station obeys
in its normal operation neither the expectations and interventions of passers-
by nor those of its producer or serviceman. It may be justified to say: the
clock works by itself, and those who want to use it, or must use it,
inescapably have their time prestructured by it.
Accordingly, Norbert Elias can say, at the beginning of his essay On Time,
that clocks are 'socially normated natural events with recurring patterns'
(Elias 1984: vii) It is easy to generalize this notion to all machines. The
'natural' chains of events within machinery itself are to be regarded as
socially normated. The normation is implemented through technical norms.
Such technical norms are temporally stabilized action prescriptions for
artifacts based on a legitimate order. Artifacts normated in this fashion pre-
form the action patterns of those who consent to have them. One aspect of
this process, however, uninteresting to Elias but central to us, is the autho-
rizing role of organizations in the process of social normation. However, in
deciding what is the proper timing for a given process, organizations are
themselves dependent on machines produced by other organizations to
measure this, and so on in this never-ending chain.
The third sub-genre consists of norms for the natural environment, for
example '600 becquerel per kg reindeer!'. Other environmental technical
standards are, for instance, emission and immission limits for SO2 air pol-
lution, or the nitrate content of ground water, or the exposure of the human
body to radiation, measured in REM. These norms prescribe the extent to
which incursions of ecological or bodily environments by machinery and
other technical undertakings are to be tolerated. Such norms, and their
value references, cannot be inscribed into actors and/or technical artifacts
unless one wishes to acknowledge and is able to read Nature's Own
Rights.
All these examples show that technical norms are strongly intertextual. First
of all, all three kinds of technical norms are specified by recourse to a
variety of prescriptions for measuring and testing (for humans, for non-
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human artifacts, and for nature, in turn), in the last analysis to the globally
obligatory meter/second/gram/bit notation, on whose prescriptions and
standard events all other conventional measures are based. This is, so to
say, the foundation or DNA of technical norms. Second, they are linked to
technical supertext consisting of a multitude of interrelated general proce-
dural norms and maxims, including the crucial prescriptions concerning the
normating procedures and capabilities themselves, as laid down, for
instance, in DIN 820. Third, technical norms are always referring back to
non-technical ones.
Two forms of intertextuality may be derived from these observations. One
concerns intra-technical references. Technical norms, in the narrow meaning
of the term given above, that for the operations of materials or machines, are
always being connected to environmental technical norms on the one hand,
and technical norms for users' or producers' actions on the other.
Second, organizations establish and maintain manifold intertextualities
between all kinds of technical norms on the one hand, and extra technical-
action orientations, institutionalized rules and cultural symbols on the other.
Remember the naturalness of the mineral water, the Good Life, the invita-
tion to 'participate'!, the royal symbol. One can show that there is a pecu-
liar reciprocity between the normative structures embedded in technical
artifacts and the (technical and non-technical) norms governing their pro-
duction and use. The same holds for both these structures and environ-
mental quality standards. Parts of each of these normative programmes are
mutually reflected, and, in a way, copied on to each other. It can be shown,
in other words, that every machine norm implies a producer and/or user
norm and every producer/user norm contains a machine norm. Similarly,
each of these kinds of norms reflect certain normative images of natural
contexts, and vice versa.
The examples we have used for three kinds of technical norms are in no
way unambiguous, and their attribution to one class or the other is usually
controversial. Action standards such as '3.2 m max.' may as well be inter-
preted as operational prescriptions for artifacts (bridges), and norms for
artifacts such as '220 V' as prescriptions for consumers not to employ
devices that do not comply with this standard. However, this not only about,
but more than, simple (or even not so simple) semantic classifications: it
is a matter of ontology. How the norms are classified into three sub-genres
has clear consequences, which can be pragmatically evaluated in a given
time and space. Bruno Latour demands a parliament of things, but, for the
time being, the norms of parliamentary action are not applicable to objects.
People are seldom called 'human resources' straight in their faces, and few
believe that sun temperature can be controlled by a thermostat.
This is not to say that the three realms of application of technical norms:
humans, artifacts and nature, are safely and forever fixed within the three
sub-genres. Blurring genres and redefining their boundaries is a matter of
politics, jokes ('be nice to your computer!') and experiment. The notion of
'organization' blends, in fact, all three of them (this is why organizations
can produce signatures on matter). The effects of blending are pragmati-
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cally decided: for some purposes it is important to keep them apart, for
others, to blend them. Perrow (1986), for instance, performed a blending
which may be considered dangerous by some. He took from organization
studies the concepts of loose and tight coupling (Weick 1979) and applied
them to an analysis of large-scale technical systems, such as nuclear reac-
tors. In doing so, however, he did not distinguish between the loose and
tight coupling of human (i.e., somatically based) action components (in the
design and construction) of the operations of machine components, and of
the natural systems carrying them.
Consider, now, a nuclear plant: notwithstanding the dense web of cross-
references between relevant behavioural norms, technical standards
imprinted in machines and limits for tolerable environmental pollution, the
inscription, proof, correction and revision of technical norms proceed quite
differently in each of these three domains. More importantly, the necessary
links between technical norms and non-technical meanings and symbols,
and, by the same token, these meanings and symbols themselves, are
notoriously difficult to delegate to machine-type operations or to be repaired
when there is insufficient delegation. The sense of beauty guiding highly
calculated modes of composing or hearing music, the need for power driving
the operation of a management information system, the horror induced by
perfected war machines cannot reside in machinery itself. It is difficult to
inscribe into technical orders governing technical artifacts attributes such as
responsible or irresponsible, creative or non-creative, because these attrib-
utes cannot be judged against technical norms in the sense given above. The
notions producing a sense of responsibility, or creativeness, or horror can-
not be transcribed onto natural events outside our bodies.
Let us return then to our initial point about the silence of technical inscrip-
tion. Technical norms tend to operate out of awareness of their habitual
readers. Smoothly and reliably prescribed machine-technical operations and
assemblies become more or less sealed-off from ongoing representations
of organizational life. Parts of - and, if our argument is plausible, con-
stitutive parts of - the action nets represented by the concept 'organiza-
tion' remain invisible and are not given a voice in organizational accounts.
As with the legal order inscribed in day-to-day urban traffic-action nets:
once past the drivers' school, drivers never activate the knowledge of trans-
portation acts, and even deviant behaviour prompts only a partial activa-
tion. Nevertheless, drivers, cars, roadside trees, pedestrians, bicycles, red
lights, time tables and all the other actants associating in urban transport
effortlessly follow this order through the trail of inscriptions it has left.
Technical norms are the institutional structure of machinery.
Technology as Palimpsest
We are written as we write, and in order to determine the place of things
in a world of signs we must, in the first place, ask how it is written. The
specificity of our project is that we wish to focus on a collective writer,
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organizations, whose text is institutionalized social norms, and genre -
technical norms. In this, we believe we are following Cooper's (1989)
appeal to concentrate on the organization of writing - in this case, the
organization of writing done by organizations on and indeed into the
medium of practical apparatus. As a textual metaphor for extrasomatic tech-
nology one could then suggest that of technology as palimpsest: writing
material used many times after earlier writing has been erased. Large-scale
machinery would then be something like Super-Magic Memo Pads, as it
were, technologically superior to earlier versions of palimpsests in that they
allow for many more layers and interpretations, for a deeper engraving as
much as impenetrability of original text and meaning. Alternatively, one
can think of corporate electronic information processing machinery as a
gigantic mechanic pen which (not who) always writes anew on the ever
patient screen.
The presumed supernaturality (super-personality?) of the Author supports
the powerful illusion that only one correct inscription is possible at a
given time. Technical inscriptions are taken for granted more easily than
other organizational texts. A future task would be to examine more closely
the relationships between technical and other organizational texts, and thus
bring to bear the hitherto divergent research traditions in organization and
technology. In particular, work in organizational accounting and the
beginning work on metrological aspects in the generation and control of
technology needs to be brought together in a general social metrology. If
technologies can be understood as texts, and share certain properties with
non-technological texts, the specificity of technological texts must be
explored further. Such focus on a particular grammar of technological
texts (i.e. general metrological issues) raises again the problems that authors
such as Marcuse or Ellul have expounded, but not rendered researchable:
the cultural significance of ongoing and seemingly progressive metrifi-
cation.
One of the ideological master narratives of late modernity is that norms of
a technical nature have grown into the silent majority, and thereby the moral
majority, of norms. Dead work replaces life work; bureaucracy replaces
charisma; metrics replaces ethics. This story subscribes to the old ratio-
nalistic paradigm, packed into that peculiar image of the zero-sum-game,
according to which ever more technology is bought at the price of ever less
meaning, culture, and moral order. The point could be made, in fact, that
this is still the predominant interpretative figure in social science technol-
ogy research, including critical post-structuralist strains.
Instead, we have argued that the organizational studies of technology should
retrace the processes by which the continued generation of technical sys-
tems and machinery occasions a multiplication of meanings, cultural vari-
ants and moral projections. After all, materialized technology represents
those deepest levels of organizational inscription which not only allow for,
but provoke and necessitate, endless over-writings and hidings of the initial
scripts.
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